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1 Introduction
A civil society, in which citizens act together to express their own interests, to exchange
information, to strive for mutual goals, and to inﬂuence government, has long been consid-
ered a common feature of every successful democracy. Such civic engagements as joining
political parties, signing petitions, keeping abreast of the news, and in particular, joining
community organizations have both increased and decreased at diﬀerent times in history.
The two decades following 1945, for example, saw a period in which community involve-
ment was the most prevalent in American history. Since the late 1960s or early 1970s,
however, the level of civic engagement has declined signiﬁcantly (Putnam 2000).
This paper examines the role of conservatism as a root of civic engagement. In doing
so, I address a set of related questions. I begin with a descriptive question: How general
are declining trends in several forms of civic engagement? To answer this question, I create
and present three civic engagement measures which represent theoretically diﬀerent forms
of civic engagement on a quarterly basis using the Roper Social and Political Trends Data
from 1973 to 1994.1
Then I turn to explanations for the trends and ask: Why does the civic engagement
ﬂuctuate over time? I hypothesize that a shift in the political climate toward a con-
servative direction inﬂuences activeness of civic engagement, but the eﬀect varies over
time because of the changing nature of conservatism. To test the hypothesis, I model
1The dataset includes selected items from 207 public opinion surveys conducted as part of the Roper
Reports series by the Roper Organization or its successor organization RoperASW between 1973 and
1994. More than 400,000 unique respondents are included in this cumulative ﬁle.
Each survey contains a twelve-item battery of questions about participation in political and social
activities as well as information about respondents’ demographic characteristics. With varying frequency,
these surveys also include a wide range of other social and civic activities ranging from volunteer work
to church attendance to dinner with friends.
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the dynamics of the civic engagement as an autoregressive fractionally integrated moving
average (ARFIMA) process and introduce a time-varying parameter associated with the
eﬀect of the conservative mood among citizens on the civic engagement.
A understanding of the impact of conservatism and its dynamics alerts us to the factors
that promote a civil society. Answers to these questions will help us ﬁnd the way by which
civic engagement, a key to a successful democracy, is revived.
2 Building Measures of Civic Engagement
Given that civic engagement takes various forms, the question is how to construct em-
pirical measures of civic engagement so that we can see if it has really declined. The
Roper Social and Political Trends Data has a simple check list of twelve diﬀerent civic
activities shown in Table 1, and asked thousands of Americans “Which, if any, of these
things have you happened to do in the past year?” almost every month from 1973 to
1994. First, I transform each activity into a time series by tracking the percentage of
respondents reporting to have done it. Then, to aggregate these twelve activities into a
time series of civic engagement, I use the “recursive dyadic dominance method” (Stimson
1999) for constructing a time series from survey marginals.2 Stimson’s modeling process
is designed to identify the shared movement over time across diﬀerent public opinion time
series, using an exponential smoothing model to decrease the amount of ﬂuctuation due to
sampling. The resulting measure is a quarterly civic engagement time series, scaled from
2Stimson’s method has been widely used to construct time series measures of public opinion (Durr,
Martin and Wolbrecht 2000; Freeman, Kellstedt and Williams 1998; Chanley, Rudolph and Rahn 2000;
Kellstedt 2000; Keele 2005). Especially Keele (2005) develops empirical measures of social capital in the
form of time series measures of civic engagement and interpersonal trust composed of over 20 indicators
and 1000 survey marginals.
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0 to 100 with higher values indicating higher levels of civic engagement for the period
1973:3 to 1994:2, and is displayed in Figure 1.3
Figure 1: Trend in Civic Engagement
Civic engagement exhibits little short-term movement but has steadily declined during
the period under observation. Although it is hard to judge whether the decline is moderate
or steep, civic engagement did drop over six points.
Next, because Putnam (2000) suggests that these twelve civic activities can be cate-
gorized into three forms, which are partisan activity, communal participation, and public
expression, I develop the corresponding time series measures of civic engagement, also
scaled from 0 to 100 for the same period. The components of each form of civic en-
gagement are shown in Table 1. Stimson’s method produces the quarterly time series of
partisan activity, communal participation, and public expression displayed in Figures 2,
3No surveys on these twelve civic activities are available for October and November from 1973-1994.
Stimson’s algorithm solves the missing values problem and creates a time series of civic engagement from
the twelve civic activity measures including missing values. The time series are constructed on a quarterly
basis because my key independent variable, a conservative mood time series, is measured quarterly.
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3, and 4, respectively.
Table 1: Forms of Civic Engagement
Civic Engagement
² Partisan Activity
– Attending political rally or speech
– Working for a political party
– Holding or running for political oﬃce
² Communal Participation
– Attending a public meeting on town or school aﬀairs
– Serving as an oﬃcer of some club or organization
– Serving on a committee for some local organization
– Being a member of some group interested in better government
² Public Expression
– Signing a petition
– Writing Congressional Representatives or Senator
– Writing a letter to the paper
– Making a speech
– Writing an article for a magazine or newspaper
Partisan activity, communal participation, and public expression appear to share some
common variation as they declined noticeably in the 1990s. But while all of them experi-
ence noticeable drops, the declines are diﬀerent in magnitude. The decline in communal
participation(about 8 point) is greater than those in partisan activity and public expres-
sion (about 5 and 6 point, respectively). These time series are also diﬀerent as partisan
activity ﬂuctuates more than communal participation and public expression.
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Figure 2: Trend in Partisan Activity
Figure 3: Trend in Communal Participation
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Figure 4: Trend in Public Expression
3 Explaining the Dynamics of the Civic Engagement
While identifying the decline in civic engagement is easy, separating out causal mecha-
nisms to explain it has proved diﬃcult. Previous explanations for the declines in civic
engagement have focused on mobilization, and time and money resources (Rosenstone
and Hansen 1993; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995; Putnam 2000), yet many of these
explanations have overlooked the role of the political climate. In addition, they have been
cast largely in static terms.4 I oﬀer a hypothesis that predicts the aggregate dynamics of
civic engagement, focusing on the role of the political climate, speciﬁcally conservatism.
4The longitudinal analysis in Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) models the month-to-month changes in
political involvement from late 1973 to the end of 1990, but it is not a rigorous time-series analysis. A
notable exception is Keele (2005).
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3.1 Political Climate and Civic Engagement
The political climate, especially its ideological nature, has important implications for
how politically active citizens are . As Verba and Nie (1972) note, participation levels
of Democrats and Republicans are diﬀerent. I argue further that ideological distinctions
may have a changing impact on political participation or civic engagement over time. I
hypothesize that as the political climate becomes more conservative, civic engagement
should increase.
During the period of my analysis, especially in the 1980s, the evangelical movement
experienced phenomenal growth and began to impact the political landscape (Diamond
1995). During the 1970s, the major social issues such as women’s equality, abortion, and
gay rights were raised, which might develop individualism and even selﬁshness among
people. As a reaction, evangelicals started to promote the supremacy of the traditional
family and community values. For example, Pat Robertson, who is a conservative tel-
evangelist and the founder of the Christian Coalition, expressed his concern about the
collapse of American society caused by moral decay in his speech in 1985, saying:
“What kind of a monstrous thing have we got? When there is no vision of
God, when there’s no vision of God’s law, when there’s no vision of right and
wrong, when there’s no vision of ultimate reward and ultimate punishment,
when there’s no vision of decency, when there’s no standard of values, society
breaks apart and everybody does what he wants to do.”(Robertson 1985)
Evangelicals are diﬀerent from mainline protestants in their mobilization strategies. As
Wuthnow (1999) observes, the Moral Majority, Religious Roundtable, and other conserva-
tive Christian movements that emerged between 1978 and 1980 mobilized more attention
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in the media than they did energy among evangelical church members. Although Wuth-
now (1999) and Putnam (2000) claim that evangelicals are less likely to participate in
community activity than mainline protestants, I argue that the political climate created
by the evangelical movements in the 1980s stimulated civic activism by articulating the
idea of community.
I do not expect, however, that the eﬀect of conservatism on civic engagement is con-
stant over time as the ideology-participation relationship (Beck and Jennings 1979, 1984)
and partisanship-participation relationship (Verba and Nie 1972; Gershtenson 2002) are
changing. In the 1970s, conservatives did not have any issues that promote civic en-
gagement while liberals might have. But, in the 1980s, as noted above, the rise of the
conservative Christian movements made conservatism more family and community ori-
ented. Thus, I predict that conservatism among citizens has a more positive (or less
negative) impact on civic engagement in the 1980s than in the 1970s.
I measure the degree of conservatism that characterizes the political environment by
the “policy mood” measure of Stimson (1999). Stimson’s “policy mood” is a quarterly
time series, scaled from 0 to 100 with higher values indicating more liberal mood. He
created it based on 197 survey questions on domestic issues such as gun control, environ-
ment, and welfare, using his recursive dyadic dominance method. Conceptually, it is “the
shared thing carried by individual people that underlies common response to disparate
issues.”(Stimson 1999, p.3) Because it originally measures the degree of liberalism, it must
be recalculate to measure conservatism; 100¡ “policy mood” as displayed in Figure 5.
What can be seen in Figure 5 is a pattern of conservatism building in the early 1970s,
peaking in the early 1980s, followed by a movement to a liberal peak around 1990, and a
returning trend to conservatism.
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Figure 5: Trend in Conservatism
4 Analysis
The ﬁrst half of this section examines the causal relationships between conservatism and
four forms of civic engagement to provide a basis for analyses of the changing eﬀect in
the second half. Table 2 shows summary statistics of four forms of civic engagement, and
political and economic variables from the third quarter of 1973 to the second quarter of
1994 (what these political and economic variables mean is explained in the second half
of this section). The analysis starts with verifying stationarity of each time-series by the
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, and then the multivariate Granger causal relationship is
examined using vector autoregression (VAR).
9
WIAS Discussion Paper No.2008-002
Table 2: Summary Statistics for Civic Engagement, Political, and Economic Variables,
Q3 1973-Q2 1994
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
Civic Engagementa 84 11.42 1.55 7.43 14.66
Partisan Activitya 84 5.94 1.20 3.48 9.34
Communal Participationa 84 10.01 1.55 6.25 13.96
Public Expressiona 84 16.44 1.71 11.60 18.95
Conservatismb 84 40.41 4.61 31.98 50.91
Household Incomea 84 23.93 1.61 20.92 26.67
% College Graduatena 84 38.07 4.88 28.39 44.04
% Full-time Workera 84 48.03 2.40 42.67 53.74
Source: aThe Roper Social and Political Trends Data, and bJames Stimson’s website.
4.1 ADF Tests
In essence, the Dickey-Fuller test for determining whether a time series is integrated
involves the regression of ﬁrst diﬀerences of the series on its lagged levels. If the series
is stationary, the regression coeﬃcient associated with the lagged levels will be negative
and signiﬁcant. The ADF test includes a number of lags of the ﬁrst diﬀerences on the
right-hand side of the regression equation and is appropriate if the resulting coeﬃcients
are signiﬁcant (Engle and Granger 1987). Critical values for these tests are greater than
normal, due to nonstandard distributions, and are reported by MacKinnon (1991).
The data-dependent general-to-speciﬁc criterion is used to choose the optimum lag
structure for the error process of the Dickey-Fuller equation as advocated by Ng and
Perron (1995) and Perron (1997). Under this process, the speciﬁc order is chosen out
of the general order (I considered here 11 lags based on the Schwert’s rule of thumb:
m = Intf12(T=100) 14g) on the basis of the standard t-tests of signiﬁcance for the lag
terms.
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Table 3: Augmented Dickey Fuller Tests for a Unit Root
Regression: ∆zt = ®0 + ®1t+ ®2zt¡1 +
Pm
i=1 ¯i∆zt¡i + ²t
ADF Lag order(m)
Civic Engagement -1.009 9
Partisan Activity -1.950 8
Communal Participation - .663 10
Public Expression - .933 9
Conservatism -2.440 8
Household Income - .832 8
% College Graduaten -2.148 0
% Full-time Worker -2.498 0
An asterisk indicates signiﬁcance (rejection of the unit root null) at the 5 per
cent level.
The results in Table 3 suggest that all of the variables are nonstationary. Therefore,
I take the ﬁrst diﬀerence of them.
4.2 The VAR Model
I examine the relationship between the variables using Vector Autoregression (VAR)
methodology. VAR (Freeman, Williams and Lin 1989; Simms 1980) helps to evaluate
the causal directions of the relationships between conservatism and four forms of civic en-
gagement. I select VAR because I want to examine the determinants of civic engagement
without making the variables a priori exogenous.
VAR is a multivariate extension of the Granger (1969) approach to causal inference.
Each dependent variable is regressed on lagged values of itself and other dependent vari-
ables in the system. VAR provides an excellent control for history, by taking into account
several lags of all of the endogenous variables in the system.
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I determine lag lengths empirically using methods based on Simms (1980). Table 4
shows the process. The likelihood ratios(LR) are calculated to test if there is a diﬀerence
in log-likelihood between the pair of diﬀerent lag speciﬁcations (up to 11 lags). The results
suggests that the appropriate lag length is 3 for partisan activity, and 2 for others.
VAR evaluates relationships by conducting joint hypothesis tests for the blocks of lags
associated with each variable. In sum, the VAR model is essentially a series of regression
equations where each endogenous variable in the system is set equal to lagged values of
itself and all of the other variables in the system. The VAR model has many parameters,
and they may be diﬃcult to interpret due to complex interactions and feedback between
the variables in the model. As a result, the dynamic properties of a VAR are often
summarized using various types of structural analysis. One of main types of structural
analysis summaries is Granger causality tests.
4.3 Granger Causality
First, to examine the causal relationships between the variables, I perform Granger
tests(Freeman 1983; Freeman, Williams and Lin 1989). There are two main interests.
The ﬁrst is a test of whether four forms of civic engagement Granger cause conservatism,
and the second is a test of whether conservatism Granger causes four forms of civic en-
gagement. For the ﬁrst Granger test, if the null is rejected, we infer that civic engagement
Granger causes conservatism. Under the second Granger test, if the null is rejected, we
infer that conservatism Granger causes civic engagement.
The results appear in Table 5. Each cell in the table represents an estimated equation.
The p values associated with each equation appear in the cells of the table. The ﬁrst test
12
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Table 4: Likelihood Ratio Tests for Lag Order
Pair for Comparison LR Pair for Comparison LR
Civic Engagement Partisan Activity
Lag = 1 vs. Lag = 2 47.955* Lag = 1 vs. Lag = 2 44.352*
Lag = 2 vs. Lag = 3 45.059* Lag = 2 vs. Lag = 3 42.272*
Lag = 3 vs. Lag = 4 31.557 Lag = 3 vs. Lag = 4 38.457*
Lag = 4 vs. Lag = 5 21.280 Lag = 4 vs. Lag = 5 25.108
Lag = 5 vs. Lag = 6 15.398 Lag = 5 vs. Lag = 6 31.486
Lag = 6 vs. Lag = 7 24.632 Lag = 6 vs. Lag = 7 32.084
Lag = 7 vs. Lag = 8 23.372 Lag = 7 vs. Lag = 8 32.106
Lag = 8 vs. Lag = 9 20.689 Lag = 8 vs. Lag = 9 27.547
Lag = 9 vs. Lag = 10 15.975 Lag = 9 vs. Lag = 10 22.025
Lag = 10 vs. Lag = 11 9.215 Lag = 10 vs. Lag = 11 27.203
Communal Participation Public Expression
Lag = 1 vs. Lag = 2 50.026* Lag = 1 vs. Lag = 2 51.320*
Lag = 2 vs. Lag = 3 48.771* Lag = 2 vs. Lag = 3 49.983*
Lag = 3 vs. Lag = 4 33.918 Lag = 3 vs. Lag = 4 33.785
Lag = 4 vs. Lag = 5 23.070 Lag = 4 vs. Lag = 5 26.830
Lag = 5 vs. Lag = 6 19.363 Lag = 5 vs. Lag = 6 13.977
Lag = 6 vs. Lag = 7 26.483 Lag = 6 vs. Lag = 7 30.990
Lag = 7 vs. Lag = 8 30.290 Lag = 7 vs. Lag = 8 29.844
Lag = 8 vs. Lag = 9 26.227 Lag = 8 vs. Lag = 9 24.408
Lag = 9 vs. Lag = 10 24.606 Lag = 9 vs. Lag = 10 21.156
Lag = 10 vs. Lag = 11 15.706 Lag = 10 vs. Lag = 11 20.404
An asterisk indicates signiﬁcance (rejection of no diﬀerence) at the
5 percent level.
LR = (T ¡ k)(logjDRj ¡ logjDU j) s Â2(q), where DR is the matrix
of cross products of residuals when the model is restricted; DU is the
same matrix for the unrestricted model; k is the total number of
regression coeﬃcients estimated divided by the number of
equations; q is the number of restrictions.
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Table 5: Direction of Granger Causality
Independent variable Civic Engagement Conservatism
Civic Engagement - .338
Conservatism .007 -
Note. Each variable was lagged 3 months. OLS estimates.
The numbers are block F-test p-values.
Independent variable Partisan Activity Conservatism
Partisan Activity - .911
Conservatism .050 -
Note. Each variable was lagged 4 months. OLS estimates.
The numbers are block F-test p-values.
Independent variable Communal Participation Conservatism
Communal Participation - .289
Conservatism .008 -
Note. Each variable was lagged 3 months. OLS estimates.
The numbers are block F-test p-values.
Independent variable Public Expression Conservatism
Public Expression - .116
Conservatism .007 -
Note. Each variable was lagged 3 months. OLS estimates.
The numbers are block F-test p-values.
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is for whether civic engagement has any eﬀect on conservatism. I estimate with a p
value of .338 for “civic engagement,” .911 for “partisan activity, ” .289 for “communal
participation,” and .116 for “public expression.” Thus I can infer that exogenous shocks
to all of four forms of civic engagement will not aﬀect the movement of conservatism over
time.
I also test whether government conservatism aﬀects the movement of for forms of civic
engagement over time, and estimate with statistically signiﬁcant p-values that conser-
vatism do aﬀect all of four forms of civic engagement. The statistical evidence demon-
strates that civic engagement is Granger caused by conservatism. While movement in
conservatism over time will cause shifts in civic engagement, shocks to civic engagement
will leave conservatism unchanged. Thus, I can straightforwardly model civic engagement
with a simple recursive system in the following analysis.
4.4 ARFIMA model
How does civic engagement respond to changes in the political climate? To answer this
question, I consider the following statistical model.
CEt = ¯1 + ¯2Ct + ¯3It + ¯4Et + ¯5Jt + ut
where t = 1973 Q3, 1973 Q4, ..., 1994 Q2, CE = civic engagement; C = conservatism ; I =
mean household income in CPI adjusted dollars; E = the percentage of college graduates;
and J = the percentage of full-time workers. Mean household income in CPI adjusted
dollars, the percentage of college graduates, and the percentage of full-time workers are
included in the model as control variables(The summary statistics are shown in 2). They
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correspond to money, ability, and time resources suggested in previous studies such as
Rosenstone and Hansen (1993); Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995); Putnam (2000);
Knack (2002); and Keele (2005). Data on them are also available from the Roper Social
and Political Trends Data, 1973-1994. 5
I use the ARFIMA (autoregressive fractionally integrated moving average) model,
originally developed by Hosking (1981) and Granger and Joyeux (1980), to analyze my
time series data. By ARFIMA modeling, I can remove the part of the series that can be
explained by itself. ARFIMA modeling allows time series to be fractionally integrated
(0 < I < 1 ) while in ARIMA modeling, researchers have to decide whether their data
were generated by an I = 0 (stationary) or an I = 1 (nonstationary, i.e., unit-root)
process. The ARFIMA model is more realistic than the ARIMA model in that it does not
impose on researchers the dichotomy between stationary and nonstationary time series.
The detailed description and signiﬁcance of the concept of fractional dynamics is given in
Appendix I.
I estimate ARFIMA(p; d; q) using the modiﬁed proﬁle likelihood (MPL) function.6
Table 6 presents the estimates of the univariate models. The ARFIMA model estimate is
(3; d; 2) with d = :167 for civic engagement, (0; d; 0) with d = :896 for partisan activity,
(3; d; 2) with d = :156 for communal participation, (3; d; 2) with d = :104 for public
expression, (4; d; 0) with d = 0:266 for conservatism, (2; d; 2) with d = 1:141 for mean
household income, (1; d; 1) with d = :449 for the percentage of college graduates, and
5They are originally monthly time series with missing values for October and November. I transformed
them into quarterly time series, estimating the missing values with Stimson’s method.
6The modiﬁed proﬁle likelihood is a procedure to reduce the number of independent parameters by
writing some parameters as functions of other parameters, based directly on a probability distribution.
See Cox and Reid (1987) for more detail.
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(1; d; 0) with d = ¡:064 for the percentage of full-time workers.7
Table 6: ARFIMA Model Estimates and t-ratios
d (SE) t-ratio for d = 0 t-ratio for d = 1 ARMA (p; q)
Civic Engagementa .167 1.27 -6.36 (3, 2)
(.131)
Partisan Activityb .896 8.00 -.93 (0, 0)
(.112)
Communal Participationa .156 1.20 -6.49 (3, 2)
(.130)
Public Expressiona .104 1.29 -11.20 (3, 2)
(.080)
Conservatisma .266 1.67 -4.63 (4, 0)
(.160)
Household Incomeb 1.141 13.58 1.67 (2, 2)
(.084)
% College Graduatea .449 4.33 -5.30 (1, 1)
(.104)
% Full-time Workera .935 9.26 -.64 (0, 0)
(.101)b
Note: The Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC)was used to select the best model from
ARFIMA(0; d; 0) to ARFIMA(4; d; 4).
a Identiﬁed and estimated from levels.
b Identiﬁed and estimated from ﬁrst-diﬀerenced series due to nonstationarity.
I transform my time series into the white noise residuals of their respective ARFIMA
models to purge autocorrelation and insure stationarity before examining the relationship
among the series. To see how the eﬀect of conservatism on civic engagement changes
7I use OX to estimate d . OX is part of the PcGive 9.0 package and is available from
http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/Users/Doornik/index.html. I start from levels and estimate all (p; d; q)
models from (0; d; 0) to (4; d; 4) so that there are up to four AR and four MA components. In the OX
routine, stationarity with d 2 (¡5; 0:4999] is required for all time series. Therefore if d is very close to
the upper bound, we need to take the ﬁrst diﬀerence so that d ¡ 1 2 (¡5; 0:4999]. In this case, because
the estimate is not d but d ¡ 1, I need to add 1 to the estimate to obtain d. I estimate d by taking the
ﬁrst diﬀerence of partisan activity and mean household income.
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each quarter, I introduce a time-varying parameter to my model. Time varying param-
eter models assume that a regression parameter suspected of instability is a function of
time. Among classes of such models, I use the Legendre polynomial model developed in
Hinich and Roll (1981). Hinich and Roll suggest using the mutually orthogonal Legendre
polynomials Pj(z(t)). In this method, the coeﬃcient associated with conservatism in my
model can be expressed by:
¯2(t) =
nX
j=0
¯2;jPj(z(t))
where t is rescaled time and ¯2;j (j = 1; 2; :::; n ) are constants to be estimated. Each
polynomial represents the pattern of possible change in a parameter. For example, the
second order polynomial express the convex or concave pattern of the change in a param-
eter over time. The order of polynomial is determined by theory or empirical measures
such as R2, SEE, and BIC. In this analysis, SEE is used to determine the order of
polynomials, that is, I choose the model with the smallest SEE value as the best model
among all possible polynomial models (from zero-order to ﬁfth order) for respective de-
pendent variables. Technical details and the estimation procedures for this model are
given in Appendix II.
Table 7 shows the results of my multivariate model of civic engagement. For civic
engagement and public expression, a zero-order polynomial model is chosen as the best
model, and the coeﬃcient associated with conservatism (¯2;0) is not statistically signiﬁcant
at the 5 percent level, which means that the eﬀect of conservatism on civic engagement and
public expression is not signiﬁcant and not changing over time. For partisan activity and
18
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communal participation, a second-order polynomial model is selected as the best model,
and some coeﬃcients associated with conservatism are statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 or
10 percent level, which suggests that the eﬀect of conservatism on partisan activity and
communal participation changes quadratically over time. The statistical signiﬁcance of
the eﬀect of mean household income on all forms of civic engagement shows that when
household income increases, citizens are more likely to be involved in civic activities. The
percentage of college graduates has a signiﬁcant impact only on partisan activity, which
indicates that as the number of college graduates grows, people become more active in
working for their party.
Because of parameter instability, the statistical signiﬁcance of the eﬀect of conser-
vatism on civic engagement has to be examined throughout the historical period of inter-
est. For a second-order Legendre polynomial solution, the estimated eﬀect
ˆ¯
2(t) =
2X
j=0
ˆ¯
2;jPj(z(t))
is a function of time and can be plotted to show the trajectory of the estimated eﬀect
over the course of history. The variance of the eﬀect at any point of time is
V ar( ˆ¯2(t)) =
2X
j=0
Pj(z(t))
2V ar( ˆ¯2;j) + 2
X
0·h·k·2
Ph(z(t))Pk(z(t))Cov( ˆ¯2;h ˆ¯2;k)
Figures 6 and 7 show the time path and the 95% conﬁdence limits of the eﬀect of conser-
vatism on partisan activity and communal participation, respectively, represented by the
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Table 7: Hinich-Roll Time-Varying Parameter Regression Results
Dependent variable: Civic Partisan Communal Public
Engagement Activity Participation Expression
Independent variables Estimate
Constant ¯1 -.049 -.073 -.027 -.052
(.183) (.230) (.498) (.209)
Conservatism ¯2;0 .000 -.068 .012 .002
(.992) (.009) (.492) (.925)
¯2;1 - .076 .038 -
(.080) (.185)
¯2;2 - -.048 -.081 -
(.325) (.014)
Household Income ¯3 .233 .443 .263 .245
(.012) (.004) (.009) (.020)
% College Graduates ¯4 .105 .223 .043 .083
(.110) (.037) (.541) (.265)
% Full-time Workers ¯5 .012 -.023 -.010 .039
(.665) (.621) (.740) (.232)
Adj ¡R2 .116 .212 .115 .105
SEE .324 .522 .350 .367
N 83 83 83 83
Note: SEE is used to determine the order of polynomials for each model.
p values in parentheses.
Underlines indicate level of signiﬁcance at least .100.
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second-order solution.
Figure 6: Eﬀect of Conservatism on Partisan Activity: Hinich-Roll Time Varying Param-
eter Estimates
As seen in Figure 6, the second-order model for the eﬀect of conservatism on partisan
activity is consistent with my theoretical expectations as a negative eﬀect exists in the
1970s (more precisely, 1973 Q3 - 1981 Q1) but it vanishes after the early 1980s. The
negative eﬀect in the 1970s reﬂects the liberal activism at that time, but conservatives
became more politically active in the 1980s because of the rise of the community issues.
As seen in Figure 7, the second-order model for the eﬀect of conservatism on communal
participation is also consistent with my theoretical expectations as a positive eﬀect is
observed in the 1980s (more precisely, 1982 Q4 - 1989 Q2). The positive eﬀect in the
1980s is due to the emphasis of the conservative (religious) leaders on the community and
family values. Through the 1980s, a shift in the political climate toward a conservative
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Figure 7: Eﬀect of Conservatism on Communal Participation: Hinich-Roll Time Varying
Parameter Estimates
direction leads to more participation in community activity, but that relationship no longer
exists in the 1990s. Given the fact that the level of communal participation declined in
the 1970s, but levelled oﬀ in the 1980s, and then declined again in the 1990s (Figure 3),
it is possible to argue that the rise of conservatism among citizens in the 1980s put the
brakes on the declining communal participation.
5 Conclusion
The decline in civic engagement is a pervasive feature of the American political landscape.
It implies that the quality of civil society and democracy is in question. What can we do
about it? Previous studies have shown that as the resources required for civic participation
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decline, citizens are unable to join the civic life of their communities, but it is diﬃcult or
even unrealistic to provide every citizen with enough resources. What I have shown in this
paper is the impact of a political climate of an era on the level of civic engagement. Some
kinds of public mood encourage citizens to take part in their communities while others do
not. Putnam (2000) refers to the Progressive Era (1900-1915) as an example of practical
civic enthusiasm which contains many useful suggestions for us to solve the problem. In
the Progressive Era, people obviously had fewer resources in terms of time, education,
and money than these days, but they were successful in producing an extraordinary burst
of social inventiveness and political reform. Together with the results of my analysis, this
reminds us of the importance of the public mood in contemplating possible therapies.
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Appendix I: A Transfer Function Model Using Frac-
tional Integration Technique
In analyzing time series data, Box and Jenkins ARIMA techniques (Box and Jenkins 1970)
have been used to purge autocorrelation from which researchers may suﬀer with familiar
OLS regression procedures. However, ARIMA techniques are restrictive in that they
require researchers to decide whether their data were generated by an I = 0 (stationary)
or an I = 1 (nonstationary, i.e., unit-root) process. Based on this decision, researchers
have to either diﬀerence their data (if it is nonstationary) or leave it in level form (if it is
stationary). This decision has serious analytic and theoretical consequences.
Theoretically, classifying a variable as stationary implies that its value at previous
periods is forgotten at a consistent rate as it tends toward some long-term mean. But,
classifying a variable as having a unit-root implies that it has the properties of a ”random
walk”. Such a series has ”perfect memory” in the sense that its value at any time t is the
same as its value at the precious period, t¡ 1 , plus any shock incurred at time t .
Analytically, treating it as a unit-root process leads the researcher to transform it
through the process of ”ﬁrst diﬀerencing”, i.e., generating a new series based on diﬀerences
between the value of the series at consecutive time points. However, this transformation is
signiﬁcant because it prohibits the researcher from identifying any long-term relationships
that might exist between the diﬀerenced variable and other variables in the model. On
the other hand, leaving a variable in level form avoids this problem but can have nega-
tive consequences if the data generating process possesses some degree of long-memory.
Especially, spurious regression, ﬁnding a signiﬁcant relationship between variables when
none truly exists, is a likely result when variables with some degree of persistence are left
in level form.
The concept of fractional dynamics enables researchers to avoid this restrictive station-
ary versus nonstationary dichotomy (for political application, see Box-Steﬀensmeier and
Smith (1998); Lebo, Walker and Clarke (2000); Box-Steﬀensmeier and Tomlison (2000),
Clarke and Lebo (2003)). In this concept, researchers do not have to have the assumption
that time series variables must be either stationary process or random walks. It allows
time series to be fractionally integrated ( 0 < I < 1). In ARIMA notation, the data
generating process of series X can be written as follows:
Á(L)(1¡ L)dXt = µ(L)"t and "t » N(0; ¾2)
where L is a backshift operator such that Lk"t = "t¡k , Á(L) represents a stationary au-
toregressive process, µ(L) represents a stationary moving-average process, and the degree
of integration of X is measured by the fractional diﬀerencing parameter, d.
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Appendix II: Hinich-Roll Time Varying Parameter Re-
gression
For time-series regression
Yt = ¯1 + ¯2X2t + ¯kXkt + ut; t = 1; 2; :::; T
Hinich and Roll (1981) suggest that a time-varying parameter, ¯i , can be speciﬁed as
¯i(t) =
nX
j=0
¯i;jPj(z(t))
where Pj(z(t)) are the Legendre polynomials (see Table 8; n is the highest order of
the polynomials; and ¯i;j; (j = 1; 2; :::; n) are ﬁxed parameters. The reason for using
the Legendre polynomials in this speciﬁcation is that they are mutually orthogonal in
the interval [-1, 1] and therefore without the high collinearity. To ensure orthogonality,
t; (t = 1; 2; ::; T ) has to be rescaled into z(t) = [2(t ¡ 1)=(T ¡ 1)] ¡ 1 2 [¡1; 1] . For
example, for the period (1973 Q3 -1994 Q2 with T = 84) used to estimate my model,
z(t) = [2(t¡ 1)=(84¡ 1)]¡ 1. With ¯i modelled as such ¯iXit, in the regression becomes
¯iXit = [
nX
j=0
¯i;jP (z)]Xit =
nX
j=0
¯i;j[P (z)Xit]
Since P (z)Xit can be evaluated with empirical data, the regression is still linear in the
parameters ( ¯i;j ) and hence can be estimated by usual methods.
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Table 8: Legendre Orthogonal Polynomials
P0(z) = 1
P1(z) = z
P2(z) = (3z
2 ¡ 1)=2
P3(z) = (5z
3 ¡ 3z)=2
P4(z) = (35z
4 ¡ 30z2 + 3)=8
P5(z) = (63z
5 ¡ 70z3 + 15z)=8
Source: Calculated from Rodrigue’s Formula:
Pn(z) = (¡1)n=22n!)(dn=dzn)f(1¡ z2)ng.
See Beyer (1984, p.372).
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